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INTERNATIONAL DEBT OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES - ANY
STEP TOWARDS SOLUTION?
Lawrence R. Klein
The Meaningof a Solution
By now, the economichistory of the world debt problem isfairly
well understood. The roles of the recycling of the petrol surplus,
lending activitiesof money centerbanks,the run-up in world interest
rates, the deterioration of primary commodity markets,the riseof
protectionism and other eventsor phenomenahad much to do with
the origins of the problem and the attempts to manage it. The
amount of capital flight (from the developing countries) and the
world's current account discrepancy are troublesome questions that
have not been answered in a quantitative sense. That part of the prob-
lem is not fully understood. Clearly, then, there are problems to be
faced, and this presentation surveys some steps that have been
recommended to deal with them on a global and multilateral basis.
Dealing with these problems after they have been defined, how-
ever, calls for clarification of objectives. There are many actors
involved and the objectives must be mutually agreed upon; otherwise,
there can only be confrontation. The lenders, if left entirely to their
own wishes, would look for prompt pay-as-you-go servicing and re-
payment of principal on the maturity dates. This is their objective
for any normal private loan, but they are not dealing with normal
private loans and that makes the problem distinctive. In 1982, it be-
came apparent that the loans could not be serviced and repaid in the
normal course of events. This was recognized at an earlier date for
individual cases like those of Poland, Zaire and others, but in 1982,
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it was evident that many• countries having unusually large debts,
amounting to hundreds of billions of dollars, were all at once unable
to service and repay in the usual way.
From the point of view of the countries in which the main credi-
tors are located, they want to see their own financial institutions
functioning smoothly. They want to avoid a financial crisis and, at
the same time, they want to maintain commercial relations with
debtor nations. By and large, it is a case of the developed industrial
countries vis-a-vis the developing countries, and the latter are impor-
tant export destinations and import origins for the former. The 1985
figures for the United States alone show the large amounts involved
in trade with developing countries. They measure up in importance
with other geographical-economic areas.
The first response of indebted developing countries was to ask
for rescheduling terms in order to get some time to make adjust-
ments and then to agree with externally-imposed conditionsofauster-
ity, •often under IMF surveillance. It may have appeared that this
• approach was working, with Mexico as a prime example, but progress
was short-lived. Some debtors rejected the austerity line from the
start, but, by now, it is generally accepted that a growth objectiv e
must be included as part of any total solution. Growth among deve-
loping countries is actually in the self-interest of the industrial coun-
tries because they are generally involved in important trade relations
with the Third World just as the figures in Table 1 depict the situa-
tion for the United states.
•A solution, therefore, should have different components that re-
concile the positions of the banks, the creditor nations, the debtor
nations, and the multinational agencies.
1. There should be rescheduling such that debtors can meet ser-
vice obligations.
2. Maturities should be paid on revised schedule or should be
rolled over.
3. Debtors should be allowed to follow a growth path and
receive fresh credits as needed for this objective.
Settlement of the debts as originally negotiated is out of the
question. There must be some concession on the part of the credi-
tors. These concessions will have to extend beyond any that may be
associated with the rescheduling that has already taken place. Nega-KLEIN: INTERNATIONAL DEBT 3
Table1
U;S.EXPORTS / IMPORTS BY AREA,1985
($ millions)
USexports to: Western Europe Canada,Japan, Eastern Developing
Australia, New Europe Countries
Zealand, South
Africa
56,015 82,991. 3,258 71,968
USimports from:77,454 142,427 1,847 117,135
Source: Survey ofCurrent Bu$inest_ U.S. Department ofCommerce, June 1986.
tive and near-zero growth rates are, at the same time, politically
unacceptablefor the debtors.
Given these objectives,it isworthwhile exploringvarious,policies
that have beensuggested for dealingwith the debt problem. It canbe
asked whether or not particular policies are likely to achieve the
statedobjectives.
The World EconomicOutlook and Debt Indicators
There has been an expectation of prolongation of the recovery
from the world recessionof 1980-82 and also of a reinvigorationof
the ,processbecauseof the significant adjustments that have taken
placewith respectto :
1. the U.S. dollar -_ declining from its Unusualhighvaluessince
February 191_5.'
2. interest rates ,- declining with the depreciation of the U.S.
dollar.
3. inflation - brought under control in many countries, espe-
cially in line withthe decline in oil prices.
It was felt that these three adjustments would lead to an extra
half or full point of world GDP growth and also an expansion of
world trade. It may happen, but sofar the responsehasbeenmodest
or negligible..Since steps upward in oil prices seemed to generate
world recessionarymovements, it was arguedthat the decline in oil
prices would induce.a reversemovement in economic activity. The4 JOURNAL OF PHI LIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
decline has been helpful in many cases,but it hasalso set back the
producer-exporters to such an extent that the world economy has
not yet realized the full benefits. In particular, debtor countrieslike
Mexico, Venezuela, Indonesia,andNigeria areput in more precarious
positions that have far-reaching ramifications for the world as a
whole.
When the first major adjustments were being made, following
Mexico's inability to servicetheir debt in 1982, private bankersfelt
that reschedulingwith austerity on the part of the debtors would
leadto a solution of the debt problem aslong asworld growth con-
tinued at about 3 percent annually. World and OECD growth rates
have been that strong, with some periods stronger than others, yet
this kind of recovery has not been vigorousenoughto obviate the
need for a total reconsideration of the debt problem. The kind of
growth presently projected, without any special new initiatives, is
approximately at the 3 percent rate, with variations, of course,from
country to country. It will be necessaryto searchfor new policies
to deal specifically with debt issuesand alsowith the promotion of
better all-round _rowth in world trade activity.
Useful indicators of the debt situation are the serviceburden ra-
tios and the debt-export ratio.
Projections of the total debt service burdens,figured asratios to
exports, areshown in Table 2 for a numberof significant debtors.
In some countrieswith largedebt (approximately $50 billion) as
in South Korea, extremely stronggrowth enablesthem to keep the
serviceratio in restraint. It is not a significant obstacleto the econo-
my's overall expansion, especially not through export promotion.
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, the largestdebtors in Latin America,
have very high ratios and only Brazil indicates some hope for
reducing it. Some centrally-planned economies(Poland, Romania,
and Yugoslavia) have been introduced in the listing,for comparative
purposes.They are all able to show improvement in the projected
service ratio, but only through the imposition of austerity, especially
in Romania. That option can be imposed in a command economy
but not in most of the aspiringcountriesof the Third World.
Another way of looking at the burden of the debt isthrough the
level and movement of the debt/export ratio. This is often cited asa
banker's rule-of_thumb criterion for creditworthiness.In the develop-
ing world as a whole, for capital importing countries, it has
worsenedsince 1982. In Latin America, there were signsof improve-KLEIN:INTERNATIONAL DEBT 5
Table 2
SELECTED PROJECTIONS OF DEBT SERVICE RATIOS
(Percent)
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Argentina .85 .88 1.37 1.17 1.18 1.29 1.22 .98
Brazil .71 .80 .86 .93 .89 .84 .74 .59
Chile .89 1.23 1.22 1.10 1.43 1.48 1.29 .99
Mexico .65 .73 .90 .95 .85 .90 .83 .83
Venezuela .46 .49 .96 .73 .63 .55 .51 .36
Indonesia .19 .25 27 .28 .28 .30 .30 .28
SouthKorea .17 .20 .19 .18 .18 .18 .16 .15
Philippines .18 .36 .42 .31 .42 .40 .35 .32
Thailand .21 .22 .28 .24 .23 .23 .21 .18
Algeria .49 .48 .66 .66 .63 .60 .48 .44
Egypt .31 .37 .41 .41 .31 .35 .26 .27
Nigeria .31 .37 .56 .42 .36 .32 .23 .25
Poland 1.04 1.06 1.00 .62 .56 .51 .42 .37
Romania .30 .26 .21 .25 .17 .10 .06 .03
Yugoslavia .72 .69 .59 .61 .56 .52 .44 .38
Source: WEFA,Forecast ofJuly_ 1986.
ment in 1984, but in 1985, the ratio again deteriorated. Debt stands
at approximately double the exports among 93 capital-importing
countries and triple the exports for Latin America.
The principal criterion for stability isthat the interest rate should
be lessthan the rate of growth of nominal exports, both denomina-
ted in the same currency units. This criterion is a stability criterion
and is only indicative because a (nonfactor) current account surplus
could act as a supplementary stabilizing term even if the interest rate
were not less than the growth rate of exports. These relationships
can be deduced from the identity
D 1 +i D NX
{... 1 r-,
r
D/X = debt-export ratio (exports of goods and nonfactor services)6 JOURNAL oF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
i = interest rate (LIBOR or U.S. Prime)
r -- growth rate of exports




1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991,
LIBOR 10.9 8.4 7.1 7.7 7.3 9.0 8.0 8.0
USPrime 12.0 9.9 8.4 8.8 9.3 n.a. n.a. n.a.
LDCexports
(mdse) 8.5 -4.1 -6.2 7.6 13.8 9.5 10.9 ]0.8
Source:WEFA, Forecast of July, 1986
The current balances are estimated to be negative, and if interest
payments were to be deducted, they would be close tozero; there-
fore, we should not look to help from the final term on the right-
hand-side of the above identity. The LIBOR or Prime rates should
have a risk premium of about 1.5 percent added. Except for 1988,
and possibly in the next decade when the export growth rate is
projected to be high or the risk-augmented ratecomparesunfavor-
ably with the growth rate of exports. The situation looks partic-
ularly bad for this year, when LDC export s areexpected to decline.
Oil export earnings look bleak and the Pacific Basin exportersare
the only major grouping expected to show a significant gain. It is
possible that interest rates could be much lower after 1986; they are
presently falling a great deal. This could be of substantial benefit for
the debtor countries.
From this way of looking at the problem, possible routes for im-
provement of the debt problem can be laid out -- in terms of bringing
down or Stabilizing the debt-export ratio. The improvement routes
are:
(a) Bring down interest rates much further -- by another 200
basis points or more;KLEIN: INTERNATIONAL DEBT 7
(b) Revive export earnings of developing countries -- either
through larger volume (with better world growth) or through
price risesin primary markets;
(c) Improve the current account positions of developing coun-
tries -- preferably through export expansion (as in (b)) or
through import restraint, which isnot to be recommended.
Combinations under (a) (b) and (c) are certainly acceptable.
SpecificPolicy Proposals
Macroeconomic policy to get interest rates, export growth, and
current account balance Coordinated acrossdevelopedanddevelop-
ing countries can help to establishconditions in which debt-export
ratios become stabilized or improved, on average, but the total
problem requires more direct policies that get at the debt issues
immediately. Waiting for the macroeconomic environment to fall
into place has nOt yet proved to be adequate or satisfying because
the'debt problem and its unpleasantramifications persist.
A number of direct policy suggestionshavebeenmadein several
quarters;a surveyofsome will be presentedin thissection.
The United States and other advanced industrial economies
have become net debtors internationally, but they do not havethe
same crisissituationsthat are found in the developingcountries. Hol-
dersof the U.S. debt are pleasedto acceptdollarsor any other free-
ly convertible currency as interest or principal payment {servicing).
At worst, more dollarscould beprinted to pay servicingto holdersof
U.S, debt. People have confidence in the U.S. economy, although
this confidence would weaken if there were excessiveprinting. The
same cannot be said of most debtor countries in the Third World.
People would not be satisfied to accept local currency in payment.
Such forms of payment may lose exchange value rapidly or be
blocked for conversion into other currencies.If developingcountries
could servicetheir debt, in whole or in part, in local currency, they
would not feel so constrained. ProfessorUrquidi hassuggestedthat
foreign holdersof Mexican debt accept pesosin payment for interest,
at least for a significantportion of the total payment that hasbeen
assessed. This approach is interestingand hassomepotentiality but
cannot be usedfor a total settlement becausepesosmay become un-
wanted and depreciatevery much in value.8 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
Another easy or soft way to treat interest is to capitalize it. In
effect, rescheduling and other renegotiations among banks, debtor
nations, and international agencies have resulted in the making of
new credits by the banks to pay interest. The loans are kept in the
performing category and improve the appearance of bank balance
sheets,while the size of outstanding debt rises. A similar result would
be obtained by simply adding unpaid interest to the principal of the
outstanding loans. This is only a partial solution becauseit does not
provide capital funding for growth.
Bankers and other persons concerned with the debt problem have
noted that debts grew in developing countries becauseloan capital
was readily available and equity capital was not particularly sought
after. Equity funds were restricted by many developing countries.
There is an obvious trade-off. Equity funding gives more control or
power to foreign capitalists, but it easesthe service burden in slow
phasesof the business cycle. Dividends are discretionary, while inte-
rest payments are not.
Attitudes towards equity funding are changing and currently
some developing countries are actively seeking foreign funds through
this route - direct investment, joint ventures, mutual funds, special
non-voting shares and other devices. At present equity financing is
supplementary and not predominant, but it is a route that deserves
encouragement.
In the caseof economic relationships between the United States
and Mexico, there are some bargaining deals that have been suggest-
ed, but not fully explored. It has been suggested, for example, that
the United States open the border more liberally in return for more
direct investment approvals by Mexican authorities. On a project-by-
project basisthis kind of exchange can provide relief to the situation.
Mexico could probably grow more strongly and quickly if fresh U.S.
investment were encouraged. This, too, is not a solution but it is an
interesting stepto think about.
The United States,quite rightfully, hasgreat interestand concern
for Mexican economic welfare. In order to provide some crisisfunds
to Mexico, crude oil imports have been purchasedfrom Mexico to
the United States for the purpose of filling the strategic reserve.A
significant move towards medium-term stockpile goal can be done
and, at the sametime, provide liquid funds to Mexico. This wasdone
on previousoccasionsafter the emergence of the Mexican debt prob-
lem in 1982. The world oil price is now favorable for such pur-KLEIN: INTERNATIONAL DEBT 9
chases.This form of capital relief for Mexico cannot be duplicated
throughout the developing country world of high debtors, but it does
help, and that is important at the presenttime.
The Baker initiative created _headlinesand mucheconomic inter-
.est when it was first announcedl at the Seoul meetings of the Inter:
national Monetary Fund/World_ Bank. It is well-meaning but it is
ideological, focusing attention on capital funding for private enter-
prise activity in developing countries. Some countries are attuned
more closely to socialisteconomicprinciples and others to capitalist,
free-market ideals. It is more important to get capital in place and ac-
tively produce output in the debtor nations than to satisfy an ideo-
logical bent. Many public projects can do best for some developing
countries. Some practical good may come from the Baker proposal,
but it is not yet translated into an acceptable and working system of
debt relief through growth and capital transfer.
If a main contributor to the gradual buildup of the debt problem
was the matter of recycling the petrol surplus, much can be learned
from this experience aswe confront a similar recycling problem. The
German and Japanesesurplusesare not aslarge asthe biggestOPEC
surpluses, but they are large enough to warrant concern over the
working of the process.On a number of occasions,Japaneseecono-
mists have raised the idea of a capital transfer to the developing
countries to assistimprovement of their growth path. The contribu-
tions from Germany and Japan could be generous,but they are not
largeenough to transform the world economy. If they took the lead
in this respect and enticed participation by most of the partner coun-
tries in OECD, there could be a significant turnaround in the world
economy - one large enough to realize increments to growth on a
scalethat would override the debt problem.
Project LINK hassimulated coordinated capital transfers among
OECD countries to developing countries that would bring industrial
countries to the well-known target figure of transferring 0.7 percent
of their GDP to such a cause.This isfeasiblebut substantially larger
than the figures that have been mentioned by Japaneseeconomists.
In somesense,they are looking for megaprojects in developing coun-
tries and not a buildup of capital, in general. Mega projects can be
extremely helpful but they are not solutions to the problem. It is
a question of using the Japanese initiative to launch, on a broader
scale, the kinds of programs that are used in the LINK simulations.
Annual world sumsof some $25-30 billion (this allows for inflation10 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
since the original calculations were made), if properly utilized in
developing countries, could add up to one full point of growth,
which is no meanevent for the present world economy.
Growth orientation in developing countries is feared by some
economists, even in the present world environment because,as ever,
they are worried about inflation. Econometricians at SERFINA have
simulated models of Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Peru to test
their growth policy. They would have real wage rates restored to
their higher values of about three years ago and avoid (or attenuate)
responsive price increasesby introducing an incomes policy. Unlike
conventional incomes policies in which fiscal rewards (or fiscal pe-
nalties) are introduced as a trade-off against price increases,they use
monetary (credit) concessions. Their scheme does not deal speci-
fically with the debt problem, but does try to keep growth alive and
provides an interim program for keeping up economic activity while
more fundamental solutions are being sought for thedebt problem.
Shock treatment of price controls is being tried in Argentina, Brazil
and Israel. Initially, there appears to be some degree of successin
dealing with runaway inflation, but in some cases,the staying power
of direct controls is already being called into question. The SER-
FINA proposals are worthy candidates for the inventory of amelio-
rative policies.
All the policy measures(interest paid in local currency, capitali-
zation of interest, advance oil purchasesfor inventory, equity fund-
ing, recycling of surpluses,the Baker initiatives, price controls, and
incomes policies) discussed in this section are useful, but none is
overwhelmingly attractive as a total solution -- not even combina-
tions of policies.
If it is recognized that there is no automatic growing out of the
debt problem and if all the clever/worthy proposalscannot do the
job, where does the debt problem stand? There is yet another
approach, one that the authorities and creditors are trying to avoid.
That approach is to convenea world debt conference, attended by
lenders, borrowers, governmentson both sidesand international bo-
dies. At this conference, there would be an assessmentof responsi-
bilities among all the participants, and the developing countries
should have scaled-back debts that can be fully servicedunder the
growth conditions that are projected. Such growth projections
shouldallow for any specialgrowth policieSthat may be introduced.
This is not unlike an extension of the considerations that areKLEIN: INTERNATIONAL DEBT 11
broughtto bearon bankruptcyproceedings in the privatesectorof
the U.S.economy. Whenprivatecompanies fail(or gointo "chapter
11" proceedings), they are restructuredinsuchawaythat theemer-
gingentitycan beexpectedto growandsurviveinthe roughcompe-
tition of Americanbusiness. Thereare many instances of successful
companyoperations after having goneinto,chapter 11."
The possible restructuringofsovereign nationsismorerestrictive
than thatof privateenterprises. That iswhya worlddebtconference
isneeded in orderto work outthedetailsonafair-shares basis. Both
creditor and debtor partieswill realizelosses from this procedure,
butthereshouldnot bean easyway for allto benefitsimultaneous-
ly.